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ABSTRACT
The marketing and policy research on rice of the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) is described, and the conclusions and recommendations that
emerged are discussed in the context of the decisionmaking processes in Viet Nam.  The
role of IFPRI's publication and communication activities in association with the project in
informing the policy environment are discussed.  It is clear these played a crucial role in
building consensus among the disparate groups involved in the policy process.  This
aspect was widely acknowledged by partners and stakeholders as having high value.
From extensive interviews the author describes the perceptions of partners and
stakeholders of the influence of the outcomes of the IFPRI project.  They show that the
research was regarded as being of high quality, independent, rigorous, and timely.  A
strong foundation of primary and secondary data gathering and analysis from Viet Nam
gave the modeling work on policy options a high degree of credibility among key
policymakers.  Linking the spatial equilibrium model with income distribution analysis
based on national household surveys allowed IFPRI to satisfy policymakers that relaxing
rice export quotas and internal trade restrictions on rice would not adversely impact on
regional disparities and food security and would have beneficial effects on farm prices
and poverty.  These were major concerns of policymakers prior to the project.  The
research on these and other policy options gave a degree of confidence to policymakers
that relaxing the controls would be in Viet Nam's national interest.  They made these
decisions earlier than would have been the case without the IFPRI research.
A framework for the evaluation of policy research and advice is described, which
explicitly recognizes the possibility of alternative suppliers of these two components to
IFPRI.  The framework is used to assess the impact of IFPRI's research with Viet Nam on
alternative internal and external trade policies for rice in that country. 
The policy assessment framework is used to measure the economic impact of the
policy changes, and the contribution of IFPRI's work with Viet Nam on the policies from
1995–97.  The relaxation of rice export quotas and internal restrictions on rice trade made
by the government of Viet Nam in 1995–97 are estimated to have had a present (1995)
value to Viet Nam of $61 million using a 5 percent discount rate.  If continued to 2000,
this will rise to $222 million and to $966 million by 2020.  For an incremental investment
of less than US$1 million, a conservative estimate of the benefit to Viet Nam of the IFPRI
contribution to the policy changes effected in Viet Nam from the reduction in the policy
implementation lag indicates a present value in 1995 terms of US$45 million. This
represents a benefit-cost ratio of 56.  A more optimistic assessment is that the present
value is US$91 million with a benefit-cost ratio of 114.  In addition to the welfare gains
-iv-
to Viet Nam, there were sizeable gains to the rest of the world from IFPRI's contribution. 
Inclusion of these benefits increases present value and benefit-cost estimates by 34 to 84
percent.  Around 40 percent of the contribution of IFPRI is estimated to have accrued to
the rest of the world as Viet Nam is now a major player in world rice trade.
-v-
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1.   INTRODUCTION
Public investments in agricultural research can no longer be taken for granted, if
they ever could be.  The halcyon years following the Green Revolution in Asia saw many
studies providing ample testimony of the wisdom of public support for international
agricultural research, which was initially justified primarily on altruistic grounds.  The
many studies of the economic returns to agricultural research investments in both
developed and developing countries showed they were wise decisions and that increased
investments were appropriate.  Spillovers from international agricultural research to
donor countries were subsequently shown to be large, and they reinforced the earlier more
altruistic rationale.  However, despite all of this there is a growing call for more
accountability in the continuing use of public funds in support of agricultural research,
both national and international. 
This paper is a response to the need for evidence of socioeconomic impact from
the investments by the donor community in the research and related work of the
international agricultural research centers of the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  The director general of the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) commissioned the author to conduct this external study of the
returns to policy research, as a part of the ongoing program of such studies within the
Institute.  In looking at the impact of IFPRI's policy research, attention was also to be paid
to the manner in which the information was purveyed and its effect on decision processes.
IFPRI is both a producer of new policy knowledge and a performer of applied
policy research with developing countries (Christian and Pardey 1998).  This study relates
to one of the applied policy projects.  It was apparently selected by IFPRI because it was
presumed to demonstrate effective collaboration that led to significant changes in rice
policies in the country concerned, Viet Nam.  Hence, it was not randomly selected and
this should be kept in mind.
Evaluating the impact of social science and policy research is a relatively new
field of endeavor.  Economists have been at the forefront of efforts to develop
methodologies for the assessment of the economic benefits to biological and physical
research and empirical techniques to quantify them.  Hundreds of such empirical
estimates are now available.  It is ironic that economists have yet to do the same for their
own discipline.  It is hoped that this paper advances the cause a little, in using a novel
approach in a case study of the impact of IFPRI's research with Viet Nam on rice markets
and rice policy options.   The approach uses benefit/cost analysis to assess the economic
value of the time saved in hastening a policy response.
The paper does not explicitly evaluate the intellectual quality of the research per
se, except to the extent that it influenced the type and extent of policy information and
advice and provided valid ex ante measures of likely impacts on welfare of changes.  The
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emphasis is on describing how the research was conceived, the socioeconomic and policy
environment in Viet Nam at the time, the research outputs, and the recommendations and
policy responses that ensued from the decisionmaking processes involved.  Extensive
interviews with IFPRI partners and stakeholders are described—interviews that elicited
their perceptions of the influence IFPRI had on policy responses by the government of
Viet Nam.  A framework for the evaluation of policy research and advice is described,
which explicitly recognizes the possibility of alternative suppliers to IFPRI.  The
framework is used to measure the economic impact of IFPRI's work with Viet Nam from
1995–97. 
2.   BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
IFPRI first made contact with Viet Nam in 1992 in discussions in France between
the Director of the Viet Nam Agricultural Science Institute (VASI) and one of the
subsequent IFPRI leaders of the rice policy project.  This was followed by a visit to Viet
Nam in 1993 by the Director of the Markets and Structural Studies Division of IFPRI to
explore the scope for collaboration in agricultural policy research.  In 1994, the Director
General of IFPRI and other senior management visited Viet Nam again.  At this stage,
there did not seem to be an effective demand for collaboration from the Vietnamese side,
even though the country had embarked on structural and market reforms several years
earlier.
GENESIS OF THE PROJECT
An effective demand arose with an invitation to IFPRI, along with five others, to
submit a proposal for technical assistance to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the
context of an agricultural sector loan to Viet Nam.  As with the wheat rationing study in
Pakistan, IFPRI was successful in winning a competitive bidding contract (Islam and
Garrett 1997, 15).  The “rice market monitoring and policy options study” proposal was
jointly submitted by IFPRI and Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), in May 1995
(IFPRI and DAI 1995).  The proposal successfully demonstrated IFPRI's comparative
advantage arising from its nonprofit nature, its ability to supplement the technical
assistance grant with core funds to enhance impact, knowledge generation that has a
lasting impact, the availability of multiple expertise to backstop the project team, and its
accumulated experience in working in other countries.  The project commenced in
September 1995 and was formally completed in March 1997. 
ADB designed the project to explicitly involve the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development (MARD).  The key decisionmaker was the vice minister and the key
counterparts were the director of the Department of Agricultural and Rural Development
Policy and the director of the Department of Planning and Projection.  Apparently these
two departments in MARD were not very familiar with IFPRI prior to the ADB project. 
The Planning and Projection Department was formally designated as the implementing
agency and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Policy was
represented on the Steering Committee.  In mid-1996, the new director of the latter
department became more actively involved.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The objectives of the project were to
 Undertake an in-depth investigation of rice marketing, processing, storage
and trade;
 Analyze the structure of incentives, including the impact of existing
interventions;
 Assess the impact of reforms on farmers, processors, traders, exporters,
and consumers;
 Prepare rice policy options for implementation by the government;
 Develop a data base on key rice market indicators; and 
 Provide training to staff of concerned government agencies in statistical
sampling, survey design, methods, data processing, and economic policy
analysis.
The project aimed at building an understanding of the operations of the rice
market both within Viet Nam and in terms of the export market.  Little research had been
done on the rice market prior to the IFPRI study, and the government was eager to
examine policy options related to issues like decentralization, infrastructure, marketing
costs, deregulation, credit, technology, stocks, price stabilization, and input markets.  The
objective was to assist the government in making the transition from direct quantitative or
fiscal interventions in the rice market to a more market-oriented profile and to further
facilitate the dialogue between the ADB and the government of Viet Nam. 
Essentially the project undertook a “structure, conduct, and performance” analysis
of the rice market and used this to inform the policy process in two ways.  The first was to
array the data collected in an extensive survey in a manner that described the current
marketing channels, their costs, and constraints.  The second was to utilize these primary
data and  other survey data to construct a Viet Nam agricultural spatial equilibrium model
(VASEM) to examine many options for changing policies to improve the functioning of
the rice market and generate improved economic welfare.
An ambitious series of seminars, workshops, training courses, working papers,
and research reports were planned at the outset to ensure the information would find its
way to the intended audiences. 
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The Work Plan called for a 15-month project.  It was to involve a total of 22
person-months of IFPRI senior staff time.  A three-month extension was granted by ADB
to enable IFPRI to conduct a training program in Viet Nam on the VASEM model.
PROJECT ACTIVITIES
The design of the survey and questionnaire, sampling, and the training of two
teams, one for the north and one for the south, was completed in the first part of
November 1995.  It involved two rounds of interviews with the same set of marketing
agents, namely farmers, traders, millers, and state-owned enterprises (SOE).  These were
spread over 17 of the 53 provinces with 6 districts per province and involved 3,126
respondents in each round comprising 1,388 farmers, 850 traders, 852 millers, and 36
SOE.  The survey was completed by June 1996.  In April 1996, the involvement of DAI
was concluded prior to the data analysis and policy evaluation phases. 
In addition to the survey an extensive secondary data base was built up.  This
consisted of district time series statistics on major crop production, area, yield,  prices
(farm gate, wholesale, and retail),  and seasonal rice exports (prices, quantities, and
destinations).  All data bases were computerized in a form amenable to analysis by July
1996.
Besides the training of enumerators for the primary surveys, there were five other
types of training provided by the IFPRI team:
(1) Technical
This included questionnaire drafting, tabulation, data entry, database
management, regression analysis, time series analysis, and computer graphics. 
Ten trainees were involved.
(2) Food and Agricultural Policy
Five training modules with extensive courseware were conducted from
January to May 1996, with participants from MARD, the Ministry of  Finance
(MOF), the Ministry of Trade (MOT), the Ministry of Planning and Investment
(MPI), the General Statistics Office, and the Government Price Committee.  The
training included the role of markets, demand analysis, supply response,
international trade theory, exchange rates, price monitoring, and market
performance.  It was aimed at improving the understanding of policymakers and
analysts of the features of a market economy.  After so long in a command
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economy, participants were eager to embrace these concepts, according to Goletti
(personal communication).  
There were 22 participants in the course, with 25 percent of them women. 
The average age was 40 years.  Most had bachelors degrees and a few had masters
degrees, mostly from the former Soviet Union or Central Europe. 
(3) Study Tours
A study tour in Thailand with senior advisers was organized in June 1996. 
The aim was to learn from the experience of the world's leading exporter, lessons
that would assist Viet Nam in reforming its rice system to improve performance. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) assisted in
arranging this tour after some understandable initial hesitation on the part of the
Thais. 
(4) Visiting Fellows
Three visiting Vietnamese collaborators came to IFPRI between April and
September 1996.  They joined the IFPRI team in analysis and preparation of the
final report to the ADB, which was submitted in December 1996. 
(5) Transfer of VASEM
The extension of the original project from January to March 1997 was
intended to transfer and train collaborators in MARD and other ministries in the
methodology and techniques of VASEM. 
The VASEM uses information on production, consumption, trade, and prices in a
seven-region, four-commodity (rice, maize, sweet potatoes, and cassava) model of the
food sector in Viet Nam.  The model is explained in detail in IFPRI 1997a, 1997b, and
1997d, which were used in the training modules mentioned.  The model was used to
assess rice export quotas, restrictions on internal rice trade, rice  price stabilization, and
the long-run prospects for rice exports, against the background of the need to ensure food
security and remunerative farm prices, reduce poverty and regional disparities, and
enhance export earnings. 
Within one year from the commencement of the project, the team began to
communicate the emerging results from the surveys and the analytical work associated
with the VASEM model.  This was indeed a commendable achievement.  Commencing in
October 1996 and concluding around April 1997, there were a total of three workshops
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involving 144 participants.  Two were on methodology and one on policy (Table 1).  Ten
seminars describing the results were delivered in Viet Nam to ministries, research
institutions, and universities during the same period.  Some 331 people attended these. 
Six seminars were also given outside Viet Nam at the World Bank, FAO Bangkok,
IFPRI, Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan, involving 185 people. 
More than 23 reports, papers, and training manuals relating directly to the rice
policy project were prepared.  A number are contained in the reference list at the end of
this paper.  One of the most impressive of these was the final report to the ADB (IFPRI
1996).  It comprised 535 pages and was completed in December 1996, some 15 months
after the initiation of the study.  It described the methodology; the background to the
study; the structure, conduct, and performance of the internal and external rice market;
domestic rice production and postharvest trends; rice competitiveness and food security;
and the likely effects of various policy options on welfare.  It was translated into
Vietnamese in March 1997 to ensure that the partners in the project had full benefit from
the work.  A book manuscript has also been completed and is currently under review for
publication (Goletti and Minot 1997).
The results from the project received good press coverage in 1996 and 1997.  At
least eight articles appeared during this period in the Asian Wall Street Journal, Financial
Times, Dow Jones News Service, and the Viet Nam Investment Review.
PARTNER INVOLVEMENT
A feature of the project was the close association of various institutions in Viet
Nam in all phases of the study.  The primary counterpart was the Department of Planning
and Projection in MARD, with the Department of Agricultural and Rural Development
Policy becoming more directly involved as the study proceeded.  Also involved were the
major research institutions such as the National Institute of Agricultural Planning and
Projection, Hanoi Agricultural University, the Institute of Agricultural Economics,
National Economic University in Hanoi, Can Tho University, and the Mekong Rice
Institute.  A number of these institutions were commissioned to prepare reports on the
physical, biological,  regulatory, and economic environment surrounding the rice sector. 
Other collaborators included the MPI, MOT, the Government Price Committee, the Bank
for Agriculture of Viet Nam, and the General Statistical Office.  IFPRI received many
compliments during the interviews for having involved so many organizations in the
study, which helped immeasurably in building the consensus so critical in effecting the
policy changes that emerged from the work. 
The project also had a Steering Committee which consisted solely of senior
officers from MARD.  It was chaired by the director of the Department of Planning and
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Projection of MARD.  Other members were the director of the Agricultural and Rural
Development Policy Department, the vice directors of the National Institute of
Agricultural Planning and Projection, the International Cooperation Department, and the
Planning and Projection Department.
The Steering Committee met on average about every three months, with the
frequency a little higher in the early stages and tapering off toward the end.  Advice on
the objectives of the study, the survey locations, data sources, and on hiring of staff was
provided.  The Committee urged IFPRI to focus on policy and marketing issues rather
than on production questions and to present a range of options along with implementation
plans.  It encouraged IFPRI to present as much information in its reports as possible in
view of the paucity of data and the novelty of the research methodology to partners in
Viet Nam.  The relationships between rice export policy, rice production, and domestic
food security and the role of the private sector was emphasized by the Committee.  The
chairman expressed to the author his and the Committee's pleasure at how responsive
IFPRI was to the advice offered.
RESEARCH OUTPUTS
Because the research team was responsive to the concerns of the partners in
defining their research agenda, there were many outcomes from the project for
policymakers to consider.  Indeed it is a challenge to summarize them here but it is
attempted under two headings:  information and policy options.  Most of the material in
this section is taken from IFPRI (1996), Goletti and Minot (1997), and Minot and Goletti
(1997, 1998).
Information
The insights generated by the project regarding paddy and rice marketing channels
were original and derived largely from the surveys that were conducted in 1995–96.  The
study found that the overall marketed surplus for paddy was 70 percent, and that more
than 96 percent of this was procured from farmers by the private sector.  The SOE
procured less than 3 percent of the paddy, although they were dominant in the rice export
sector.  The Mekong River Delta is the most commercialized region with a 95 percent
marketed surplus in the rainy season.  The average of the two deltas—the Mekong River
Delta and the Red River Delta—was 60 percent. 
There was limited interregional trade, with most paddy trade occurring within 100
kilometers of the residence of the marketing agents.  Rice trade was more interregional
than paddy trade.  Boats were the predominant form of transport in the south, while trucks
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were more common in the north.  Traders (assemblers, retailers, and wholesalers) were
less than 40 years old and 70 percent were women, with most specializing in the trade. 
Most agents relied on personal contacts as the main source of  information on
regulations and prices.  Credit constraints were pervasive and led to short holding
periods.  For traders this was less than a week, for millers no more than two weeks, and
for SOEs an average of four weeks.  Rice prices, in general, averaged 70 percent above
paddy prices.  Only 42 percent of the gap between prices in the north and the south of the
country was explained by the costs of transport and marketing.  The balance was mostly
explained by interregional trade barriers.  Only 54 percent of price shocks are transmitted
across markets in the country, implying that there is little market integration.  The SOEs
have marketing costs more than five times higher than those of the private sector. 
The share of higher-quality grains in rice exports from Viet Nam has risen in
recent years, and Viet Nam's export prices have risen as a consequence.  In 1989, less
than 1 percent of rice exports from Viet Nam was of a quality with <5 percent brokens;
the price received was 65 percent of that quoted for Thai rice of the same quality.  By
1995, the share of <5 percent brokens in exports had risen to more than 30 percent, with
the price at 89 percent of the Thai equivalent. 
In terms of production of paddy, the study found that the domestic resource cost in
Viet Nam was among the lowest in the world at 0.4, implying there were considerable
real savings in foreign exchange from the domestic production of rice.  Production of rice
had grown by 5.1 percent annually from 1991 to 1995, with 60 percent attributable to
yield growth. 
Some 70 percent of all households in Viet Nam grow rice, but 60 percent are net
buyers of rice.  Among the poor 53 percent are net buyers.  Thus, about half the poor
benefit from the cheap rice price policy implied by the imposition of the rice export
quotas that were in place in the early 1990s.  Rural farm households who are net sellers
are penalized by these policies.  Eighty-four percent of rural households grow rice and 43
percent market some surplus.  More poor households sell rice than do producers from rich
households, but the differences are small (Table 2).  However, the more affluent sell a
much larger proportion of their production.  Those in the Mekong River Delta stand to
gain proportionately more from increased rice prices than do those from other regions, as
measured by the Net Benefit Ratio (Table 3).  In general, both the urban poor and rich1
lose from an increase in rice prices, the former proportionately much more than the latter. 
Similarly the rural poor gain proportionately less from increased rice prices than the rich. 
The poorest in urban areas represent only 1 percent of the households or 3 percent of the
population. 
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Prior to the study the government felt that the food insecure were net buyers.  The
results indicated that many of the poor were rice farmers who were adversely affected by
rice quotas that lowered rice prices.  “In general, the 'cheap rice' policy is more effective
in transferring benefits from the rural areas to the urban areas and from the surplus
regions to the deficit regions than it is in assisting the food insecure poor” (IFPRI 1996,
400). 
Policy Simulations
The implicit tax on exports of rice from the official 2 million tons export quota in
effect in 1995 was calculated by IFPRI at about 24 percent.  Export permits were
therefore worth some $64 per ton, with an economic rent primarily to the SOE of $128
million.  The VASEM was  used to simulate the effects on economic welfare and income
distribution of various levels of relaxation of the export quotas.  At this stage of the
research, it was assumed in the model that Viet Nam's exports would face a perfectly
elastic export demand, and hence increasing exports would have no effect on the world
price.2
Removing the quota entirely was estimated by the model to result in exports of 5.7
million tons, compared with the 1995 level of 2 million.  The effects would be to increase
national income by $795 million (6 percent) and household income by $932 million (7
percent).  Retail rice prices were estimated to increase by 20 percent and rice production
by 11 percent.  Domestic consumption would fall by 14 percent.  Staple calorie
consumption would fall by some 13 percent, although there would be some offset from
increased consumption of calories derived from nonstaples. 
The overall poverty incidence in Viet Nam was estimated to fall by 1.2 percentage
points from 25 percent to 23.8 percent from the removal of quota restrictions.  Both the
rural poor and nonpoor would be major beneficiaries from removal of the quotas, while
the urban poor would stand to lose the most (Table 4).  Although poor households spend
a larger share of their budget on rice, they are also more likely to grow paddy and earn a
larger share of their income from paddy sales.  The latter effect dominates the former
when quotas are removed in the simulations.  Those in the Central Highlands would lose
in general, as would rural nonfarmers.  These groups are large net buyers of rice and
could be more than compensated by the additional taxation revenue generated by the
policy change.  Households in the two delta regions gain more than those living in the
other regions.  Income inequality in all regions is reduced, except in the Mekong River
Delta. 
The simulation of the effect of removing all internal trade restrictions on rice
showed that national income would rise by 0.4 percent ($62 million), rice production by
0.5 percent, and staple calorie consumption by 0.8 percent.  Rice exports would not be
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affected.  Rice prices in the surplus south would rise 6–7 percent; in the deficit north, they
would fall around 10 percent.  The urban poor would marginally gain in income (0.2
percent), whereas the rural poor would marginally lose (–0.1 percent).  In general, surplus
farmers in the south and consumers in the north gain, while surplus farmers in the north
and consumers in the south lose from free internal trade.  When compared with a 50
percent reduction in transport costs, freeing internal trade generated 40 percent higher
total benefits.  The two measures combined generated 18 percent higher benefits than the
sum of the two individually, which illustrates their complementarity. 
The model simulations showed that fixed export quotas stabilize domestic prices
when world prices vary.  When international prices are steady in the face of variable
domestic rice prices, however, fixed quotas exacerbate domestic price instability. 
Imposition of rice export taxes (and hence variable quotas) leads to less domestic price
instability when both international and domestic prices are allowed to fluctuate.  But
stable prices do not always transform into stable farm incomes.  Fixed quotas can
destabilize prices when domestic supply is the main source of variability.
The returns to agricultural R&D were shown to be much smaller when rice export
quotas were in place.  Total national income was $700 million higher with a 2 percent per
year paddy productivity growth rate and no export quota, compared with a 4 percent
productivity scenario with a fixed 2.8 million ton quota.  By 2005, rice exports in the
former scenario would rise to 9.4 million tons, some 237 percent higher than the 2005
base run.  
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The IFPRI research with Viet Nam had six major conclusions which led to some
13 policy recommendations arising from the data analysis and the simulation of policy
options using VASEM.  The conclusions were as follows (IFPRI 1997c):
1. Future growth of the rice sector relies on rice exports
In addition to increases in productivity, future growth of the rice sector
depends on a dramatic increase in rice exports.  As the domestic market cannot
absorb increases in production, the price of rice will decline unless external
demand provides an outlet for increased production.  If exports are not allowed to
expand, farmers will not have the incentive to increase rice production, in spite of
sectoral policies that promote agricultural productivity. 
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2. Viet Nam has a big potential for rice exports
Viet Nam has considerable rice export potential which is seriously limited
by a series of constraints related to:  (1) the policy of setting a rice export quota;
(2) infrastructural bottlenecks aggravated by high port fees; (3) poor quality of rice
exports; and (4) lack of transparency and credibility.
3. Realizing the potential depends upon the development of private marketing
Export growth depends on the development of an efficient and effective
marketing system able to meet the needs of domestic and international markets at
low cost.  The development of such a system relies heavily on the participation of
the private sector.  The private sector has responded strongly to market reform; yet
its potential contribution to the rice sector and to national income is still largely
underdeveloped.
4. Private marketing is still underdeveloped
Several factors reduce the efficiency of rice markets in Viet Nam, thus
reducing the purchasing power of households.  The main ones are:  (1) policy
restrictions on rice flows across regions; (2) barriers to entry in the export sector;
(3) limited access to credit for marketing; and (4) limited access to information.
5. Targeting and income growth are the best ways to address food security
Price policy and internal and external trade restrictions are not an effective
way to meet the food needs of the poor in so far as they lower the growth of the
economy and are not targeted to the food insecure.  Targeting and income growth
are the most effective ways to address food security. 
6. Macroeconomic bias against agriculture should be removed
The positive impact of sectoral policies to promote agricultural growth
may be diminished or even reversed by macroeconomic policies that reduce
farmers' incentives through inflationary policies and appreciation of the real
exchange rate. 
The specific policy recommendations that were made to address these issues were
described in IFPRI (1996):
1. Progressively increase the rice export quotas until they are no longer
binding.
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2. Substitute current quotas with export taxes.
3. Give private sector access to rice exports.
4. Dismantle internal policy restrictions on rice movement and freely allow
internal trade.
5. Promote rice exports with measures to improve rice quality, reduce
shipping costs, and improve Viet Nam's reputation among foreign buyers. 
6. Provide access to credit to marketing agents to facilitate procurement
operations, storage activities, and investments in processing and transport. 
7. Provide access to information on prices, food production, international
markets, and the marketing system to a variety of marketing agents, both
public and private.
8. Provide a stable and credible policy environment.
9. Monitor macro policies to ensure exchange rate depreciation does not
penalize farmers.
10. Target food security stocks and distribution to food insecure households.
11. Target investments in agricultural research to increased yields.
12. Target agricultural research to improve rice quality.
13. Invest in postharvest technology.
In the following pages, an attempt is made to assess to what extent the rice policy
research by IFPRI with its Vietnamese partners and the conclusions and recommendations
that emerged from their joint work influenced decisionmaking in Viet Nam.  The
qualitative impact of the work on the policy processes is examined, as well as the
quantitative impact on welfare and distribution.  The emphasis is primarily on the ADB-
supported project, although reference are also made to related work that continued
beyond the life of the ADB project.  In the next section, we will first explore the policy
context and responses in Viet Nam surrounding the project.
3.  POLICY CONTEXT
To properly understand the context within which the IFPRI research was
conducted and disseminated prior to determining the impact of it, it is important to
describe the socioeconomic and policy environments.  Both conditioned the content of the
research and the probability that it would influence the policy processes and responses. 
SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLICY ENVIRONMENTS
Rice is the predominant commodity in the agricultural sector of Viet Nam.  Rice
currently accounts for 78 percent of the annual crop land and 90 percent of staple food
production, which is about one half of agricultural production.  Agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries account for 29 percent of GDP, down from 50 percent in 1986.  Some 75 percent
of the labor force is engaged in this sector, and it contributes more than half of the value
of exports.  Rice contributes 75 percent of the calorie intake of Vietnamese households
and almost 30 percent of the value of consumption expenditure.
During the French colonial period in the 19th and 20th centuries, rice exports
rose, reaching 2 million tons in 1928.  This was considered to have contributed to famine. 
Goletti and Minot (1997) suggest that this and later famines after World War II  probably
contributed to the sensitivity of policymakers to the effects of rice exports on the well-
being of the poor.  They calculate the correlation between per capita consumption of rice
and exports to have been !0.48 between 1912 and 1944.  By the time the French left in
1954, rice exports were down to 0.15 million tons.  By 1995, they were back to 2 million
tons.  The share of rice in exports has varied between 13 and 20 percent. 
In 1989 Viet Nam began once again to increase rice exports, after importing
1 million tons each in 1987 and 1988 (Table 5).  This followed the liberalization program,
which commenced in 1981, with the contract system replacing collectivization of
agriculture.  This allowed farmers to cultivate individual plots and sell above-quota
surpluses on the free market. Then followed the doi moi (r novation) policy in 1986,
which announced the government's intention to encourage the development of the private
sector; to give greater priority to agriculture, exports, and consumer goods; to reduce
inflation by correcting budget deficits; and to promote international trade.  
Specific Resolutions of the Politburo which encouraged agriculture occurred in
1988 with the acceptance of the household as the basic unit of agricultural production. 
Farmers were allowed to buy, own, and sell agricultural inputs such as machines,
buffaloes, and tools.  Cooperative land was assigned to farming households for 10–15
years.  In 1989, subsidies and price controls were eliminated, fiscal policy was tightened,
gold trading was legalized, positive real interest rates were established, a unified and
devalued exchange rate was put in place, and international trade was liberalized.  In 1991,
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the export duty on rice was reduced from 10 percent to 1 percent, imported inputs used to
produce exports were exempted from duties, and the Agriculture Bank of Viet Nam was
allowed to lend to households.  Individual property rights were further strengthened in
1993 allowing farmers to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, and mortgage land.  Rice
continued to be the only commodity subject to export quotas.  All other quotas were
removed in 1995, although as discussed later, rice export quotas were substantially
increased from 1996.
These and other policy changes led to a growth in rice production of 5 percent
annually in the period 1985–95.  Yield increases contributed 57 percent of rice production
growth, improvements in cropping intensity 38 percent, and their interaction 8 percent. 
The cultivated area of rice declined during the period and contributed !4 percent to the
growth in production.  In 1995, the cultivated area of paddy was 4.2 million hectares, the
yield was 3.69 tons per hectare, and production was 25 million tons.  Some 85 percent of
paddy land is irrigated, and it has a cropping intensity of 2.  Viet Nam has commenced to
cultivate hybrid rice, and there is currently some 50,000 hectares sown. 
Between 1989–95 real prices of paddy and rice declined annually by 3.1 and 4.5
percent, respectively, but price variability fell significantly.  The price decline was
primarily because of high domestic inflation and a decline in the real exchange rate of
12.5 percent per year, against the background of a rice export growth rate of 8.4 percent
annually during the same period (Table 5).  The rice competitiveness index fell 5.5
percent per year during this period.  IFPRI estimates are that had the real exchange rate
stayed the same, price incentives for rice producers would have risen by 7 percent per
year.  Goletti conveyed this to MARD to assist it in dialogues with MOF and MOT
regarding the pervasive effect of macroeconomic settings on the rice sector. 
Thus overall socioeconomic environment in Viet Nam in the years preceding the
IFPRI involvement could be characterized as dynamic.  The rice sector was flourishing in
terms of production and productivity, in spite of  unfavorable price trends.  Incentives for
private enterprise in agriculture were having significant effects on rice production and
trade.  IFPRI was not entering a command economy in decline; but rather an emerging or
transition economy much like China some 10 years earlier.  There was hence a
receptiveness to the insights to be gained from research that addressed the policy
environment surrounding a strategic and economically important  food crop like rice,
especially with an institution versed in the traditions of  market economies, of which they
had little experience.
The government of Viet Nam had clearly embarked on a rice export strategy well
before IFPRI arrived on the scene.  Yet there was concern about continuing declines in
paddy prices for farmers, poverty and food security aspects, interregional and rural-urban
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disparities, and the linkages among all of these and their relationship to rice exports. 
These were strongly conditioned by earlier experience, especially with food security. 
However, Goletti and Minot (1997, 6-6) maintain that overall, the expansion of
rice exports since 1988 has not occurred through the reduction of domestic consumption. 
Rather, increased production has allowed domestic expansion of exports combined with
smaller increases in domestic per capita rice consumption.
POLICY RESPONSES
It is informative to juxtapose the chronology of major rice policy changes that
were made by the government of Viet Nam since IFPRI first initiated contact in 1992 to
the activities of and outcomes from IFPRI rice policy research.  This is arrayed in Table 6. 
It is clear that the government of Viet Nam embarked on a policy of increased rice
exports prior to the IFPRI involvement with Viet Nam.  However, it seems that a figure
of 2 million tons was seen as an upper limit in view of concerns about the effect of higher
levels on food security.  In late 1996, IFPRI began to actively communicate the results of
its research through papers, workshops, and seminars.  This happened to coincide with a
period of falling rice prices which triggered farmer agitations in the south.  As a result,
intense discussions took place within and among ministries and the Government Office
about price policy, exports, and internal trade.  In all of this, the MARD was the major
protagonist for liberalization, and as it was IFPRI's formal collaborator in the rice policy
project, it made explicit use of the emerging results from the joint study, especially that
which showed that Viet Nam could export up to 5 million tons without impairing food
security or exacerbating poverty and with considerable benefits to farmers.  More will be
said about this relationship in the following section. 
In the event, rice exports rose to 2.9 million tons in 1996, even though there was a
de jure quota of 2 million tons at the beginning of the year.  A crisis did not result, and in
early 1997 decrees by the Prime Minister raised the quota to 3.5 million tons, removed
the monopoly of the SOE in rice exports, lifted internal trade restrictions on rice, dropped
licences and controls on transport, and removed wholesale taxes on food.  The MOT and
MARD were given the joint responsibility to regulate exports of rice. 
In 1998, the quota was further raised to 4 million tons and private-sector
participation in rice exports was allowed.  At the time of writing, the government had
curtailed further exports in 1998 because there was concern that pro rata they were likely
to exceed the announced annual quota.  The government had in recent years announced
the annual quotas in February-March and made provisions for modifying them in the light
of emerging trends, if necessary, in September.  This was to ensure that food security was
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not jeopardized.  In 1998, the temporary correction occurred three months earlier in June,
partly because of a drought in the north.  Expectations are that, in spite of this
intervention, exports for the year will still reach 3.8 million tons.
There is still no trade allowed in the export quotas, and the rice export tax is
currently zero.  However, the MOF reserves the right to impose export taxes depending
on the demand and supply situation.  The creation of a market monitoring function within
the MARD is consistent with the finding in the IFPRI study that price discovery by
market participants is rudimentary.  IFPRI played an advisory role in the early stages of
this innovation.  Currently the system is tracing domestic, border, and international
markets for some 10 agricultural commodities, using national and international data
bases, intranet, and internet. 
4.   PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF IFPRI
It would appear from the discussion in the previous chapter that a number of the
conclusions and recommendations from the IFPRI study found their way into the policy
arena.  However, it is an altogether heroic step to assert from this congruence that the
policy changes were the direct result of IFPRI influence.  Indeed, others were involved
and it is important to recognize this. 
If one is to attempt to relate the work of IFPRI to the policy changes that took
place and are continuing to take place, reference to partners and stakeholders is necessary. 
Their perceptions about the policy environment and the role that IFPRI research played in
the processes surrounding the policy changes is critical in assessing whether IFPRI made
a difference.  In doing this, it is important to appreciate that there are understandable
sensitivities involved, which can cloud the attempt at attribution.  One does not wish to
compromise IFPRI's ability to collaborate effectively in the future in Viet Nam or
elsewhere by inappropriately crediting IFPRI with impacts that rightly belong to others or
are joint.  IFPRI's management is well aware of this. 
PARTNER AND STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS
In August-September 1998, the author undertook a series of interviews with some
35 persons who were either partners in the research endeavor or stakeholders in the
outcomes.  A list of those interviewed is contained in Appendix 1.  A list of 38 questions
was drafted based upon a reading of the documentation associated with the study and
from discussions with the primary IFPRI staff involved.  These questions covered
capacity-building and training, the policy environment, the demand for IFPRI
involvement, the communication of results, the policymaking impact, and new
information and insights (Appendix 2). 
The interviews were conducted without the presence of IFPRI staff.  In Viet Nam,
the IFPRI staff member who accompanied the author to the country introduced him to
those being interviewed and gave a brief background of the reasons for the impact study. 
He then left the room.  Where necessary an interpreter was present.  He was the primary
counterpart in the study with IFPRI from the Department of Science and Technology of
MARD.  This facilitated discussions in ways that an interpreter with no knowledge of the
project could not have done.  Admittedly he may have exerted unintentional influence on
the interviewees, but the author was satisfied that this did not affect the objectivity of the
exercise.  Each interview took no more than one hour in general.  The list of questions in
Appendix 2 was used as a guide and prompter in conducting the interviews.  At the
interviews the questions were tailored accordingly to the interviewee, because not all
were familiar with every aspect of the study or its influence. 
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It is clear that the IFPRI study is perceived as providing original insights into the
rice sector in Viet Nam, with many people who would be regarded as informed being
surprised about a number of the findings (Table 7).  Prior to the study, there was not a
detailed understanding of the sector, nor was there basic information on aspects such as
trade flows, marketing channels and margins, costs of production of paddy, price
differentials within and without the country, and transport costs.  By judiciously
combining primary and secondary data in standard “structure, conduct, and performance”
analysis, IFPRI was able to illuminate the policy environment with new and relevant
information.  This undoubtedly set the stage for a receptive audience for the policy
conclusions and recommendations. 
Many decisionmakers stressed the importance of the surveys and the primary data
analysis that followed in establishing the credibility of IFPRI to be able to address policy
issues in Viet Nam, and for the outcomes to be seriously considered by them.  The study
“changed the level of dialogue in Viet Nam” (Interview 1).  Its quantitative nature was3
regarded as a first and its employment of VASEM to address key issues as powerful. 
Other modelers were seen as too academic.  Indeed, key decisionmakers in MARD
requested IFPRI to examine many options because the quality of the data and model gave
them confidence.  In time, they became advocates for the policy recommendations that
were emerging from the study, well before the publication of the final report in December
1996 (IFPRI 1996).
The originality of the study also derived from its use of competitive market
economics to address policies.  Many senior policy analysts in Viet Nam were trained in
the former Soviet Union.  The younger analysts, who are now returning to Viet Nam with
M.S and Ph.D. degrees from the United States, Europe, and Australia, saw the IFPRI
study as a reinforcement of their newly acquired skills.  Indeed a number of current M.Sc.
students are using the IFPRI data.  The lifting of the U.S. embargo on Viet Nam in 1995
and the country's membership in the World Trade Organization and Asian Free Trade
Association were also seen as opportunities to embrace competitive market concepts. 
The transition from a command to a market economy was assisted by studies like that of
IFPRI.  Others who contributed to this transition included the Harvard Institute for
International Development and the Centre for International Economies in Canberra.
There was strong agreement that the IFPRI study had an influence on the
decisions about relaxing rice export quotas, involving the private sector in exporting, and
removing internal trade restrictions (Table 7).  No one claimed that IFPRI was the sole
influence on these policy changes, but rather that it was a key strategic input into a  policy
process that involved many actors and vested interests (Figure 1).  The 19 workshops and
seminars that were conducted by IFPRI were regarded as crucial in building the
consensus that is required in Viet Nam before such policy changes are effected.  There is
not one policymaker or institution but rather a diffuse mechanism, and IFPRI's
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independence and the quality of its research and extensive communications facilitated the
arrival of consensus on these policy issues.  There was “very hot discussion,” and the
IFPRI study added confidence that there would not be unwanted or unexpected
consequences from change (Interview 18).  Not only that, but the advice was most timely. 
Indeed, many felt that these changes occurred much earlier than they would have without
the IFPRI study.  More will be said about this in a later section of this paper.
There has been a suggestion that the ADB, who commissioned the study, made
relaxation of controls on rice a condition of the release of further funds in a sector
program loan.  It has not been possible to verify this from the ADB, but it was certainly
not the impression one received from discussions with Viet Nam's policymakers. 
Another view, by an alternative supplier of policy advice to Viet Nam, was that there was
a conspiracy between the World Bank and the ADB to influence liberalization and that
IFPRI was the “instrument” (Interview 10).
A number of interviewees felt that the choice of MARD as the partner in the
project facilitated the subsequent influence on policy processes and policy formulation. 
One alternative may have been for IFPRI to collaborate more directly with research
institutions like VASI, the Institute of Agricultural Economics, or the National
Economics University, which may have had the advantage of enabling the research and
data bases to be better institutionalized than it appears was the case.  However, this may4
have come at the expense of short-term impact, where the institutions are not explicitly
integrated into the decisionmaking process.  In this context, it is important to note that the
recommendations for the relaxation of internal and external controls on rice to the Prime
Minister came from the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development.  MARD is now
regarded as the leader in the formulation of agricultural policy, significantly because of its
collaboration with IFPRI.
Training was regarded as a strong feature of the project (Table 7).  No one was
negative about it, but there was almost universal agreement that much more is required
and that it should be continuous.  Many thought the study was excellent in both content
and quality and that the government was making extensive use of it.  “Everyone is using
it” and it was a “landmark study” (Interview 1).  The presentations in the seminars and
workshops received high praise:  “Dr. Goletti was serious yet cool, objective, and
humble; not pushy.” (Interview 10).
One of the more influential aspects of the study was said to be the work that
showed the effects of relaxation on rice export quotas on poverty and food security
(Table 7).  It will be recalled that these were major concerns of policymakers, and the
IFPRI study certainly seemed to satisfy them about this aspect.  Apparently, decisions
about whether to invest heavily in additional rice storage to accommodate the expected
growth in stocks were being considered at the end of 1996 at the same time as export
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quota relaxation was being debated, against the background of the  conclusions and
recommendations of the IFPRI study.  Indeed, these were seen to be alternatives in some
sense.  In MARD discussions at the time, issues related to possible price rises and food
security effects were paramount.  There was comfort taken in the IFPRI conclusions that,
while price rises were likely to occur if quotas were increased, this would not
compromise the poor or food security.  Provision was made to increase wages of
government employees in urban areas to compensate them if need be.  To ensure a
smooth transition, the decision was taken to ease the quotas only gradually.
A measure of the value placed on IFPRI in Viet Nam is the fact that after the
ADB-supported study on rice price policies was concluded in March 1997, further studies
involving a number of donors and partner institutions were commissioned involving the
Institute.  These covered commodity diversification, poverty mapping, starch
development, and food processing (Tables 6 and 7).  If the IFPRI contributions on rice
policies were not seen to be helpful, it is doubtful if such a derived demand would have
occurred. 
There has been only weak support evident from the interviews that the
conclusions about rice export taxes and targeted programs for the poor in the IFPRI study
have been influential in effecting change (Table 7).  Rice export taxes have been revised
up and down over recent times and currently the rate is zero.  There does seem to be
greater attention to deficit regions to ensure that rice supplies are in stock and special
programs for the poor have been strengthened. 
While IFPRI was conducting the study with Viet Nam, the capacity of MARD to
undertake policy analysis was strengthened, but it has not been a lasting impact (Items 10,
15, and 17, Table 7).  This is unfortunate because the credibility and reputation of IFPRI
was in fact enhanced in Viet Nam during the course of the study, and there is now an
unmet demand.  For example, there were requests that IFPRI expand the model to
accommodate livestock, other crops, and inputs.  The commissioned studies involving
IFPRI that followed the original rice study are not a perfect substitute for a continuing
presence in key institutions to help maintain and update data bases, give training courses,
refine models, and be responsive to emergent policy issues.  It seems no institution or
individual is currently able to run the VASEM, and only one or two have ever tried.  The
officers in MARD who worked most closely with IFPRI in the study have other priorities
and pressures that preclude them from taking the major responsibility for keeping
VASEM operational and relevant. 
Ancillary conclusions and recommendations from the study related to the
importance of macroeconomic policies on rice competitiveness, credit constraints, and the
effect of quotas on domestic price stability were not viewed by respondents as being very
influential (Table 7).  Key stakeholders like the World Bank did make explicit use of the
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data and findings.  For example, the Bank's draft Viet Nam rural development strategy
document has five citations to IFPRI's work in Viet Nam (World Bank 1998).  The
reference list at the end of this paper indicates a total of 16 papers were prepared related
to the rice study.  This excludes training manuals.  The press coverage was not noted in
the interviews as being significant. 
DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES
On rice and related policies, MARD is the preeminent ministry.  But because a
major issue like rice exports was involved, both the MOT and the MOF were also key
actors (Figure 1).  Within MARD, the director of the Department of Agricultural and
Rural Development Policy was the focal point of advocacy for change.  MARD and MOF
both were concerned about the power and economic rents being earned by the SOE from
their rice export monopoly.  MPI was also involved in the decisions, as rice is a strategic
commodity and important in the economy.  The Central Institute of Economic
Management within MPI was especially involved because it plays a key role in the whole
reform process that is under way in Viet Nam. 
International stakeholders like ADB and the World Bank played an indirect role in
the processes underlying the decisions described in Table 6.  They undoubtedly made
effective use of the IFPRI study.  However, it is not clear that their “leverage” was
instrumental in directly affecting the nature of the changes or the timing.  They, like
IFPRI, were one of the many players influencing the process.  Apparently FAO and the
United Nations Development Programme were much less explicitly involved in the
decisions that were made. 
The Government Price Committee was an important player in the process, as it is
within the Government Office arrangements, which are between the ministries and the
Prime Minister's Office.  They were kept informed of the study and participated in the
seminars and workshops.  The SOE were understandably somewhat antagonistic to the
outcomes of the IFPRI study but did allow the initial survey to include a sample of the
SOE. 
There were many other domestic stakeholder institutions that were associated with
the IFPRI study in some way, either directly, as a collaborating partner like the National
Institute of Agricultural Planning and Projection, or as a peer or mentor, such as the
universities. 
The extensive series of IFPRI seminars and workshops that took place as results
were emerging were able to reach most of the agencies arrayed in Figure 1.  Copies of the
final report to the ADB in English in December 1996 and in Vietnamese in March 1997
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followed (IFPRI 1996).  As with the study of the impact of IFPRI's research on food
ration shops in Pakistan, conducted by Islam and Garrett (1997), the influence of the
research was felt well before the formal publications arising from the study appeared. 
The influence stemmed from the effective oral communication of research results and
advocacy of policy changes to disparate audiences, who subjected them to peer scrutiny. 5
This process itself built up confidence among decisionmakers to effect the changes, as
they became assured that all those with vested and other interests were hearing the same
messages from an independent and reputable international organization.  Resolutions
from the plenums of the Communist Party and decrees from the Office of the Prime
Minister resulted.  The plenums establish broad strategies and policy directions.  The
timing and content of policy is primarily the responsibility of the Prime Minister on the
advice of ministers and the Provincial People's Committees. 
The sphere of influence of IFPRI on the policy processes in Viet Nam related to
the rice issues was hence wide and pervasive, which was appropriate given the diffuse
and participative nature of the decisionmaking environment. 
5.  ESTABLISHING THE IMPACT OF IFPRI
It is clear that the perception among partners and stakeholders is that IFPRI had an
important and timely influence on the decisionmaking processes surrounding recent
changes in rice policies in Viet Nam.  How can this be translated into measurable impact? 
Is it appropriate to attempt to attribute elements of welfare-increasing impact to IFPRI in
this way, when it was only one of many players?  Were there other potential suppliers of
the information and advice that emerged from IFPRI's work with Viet Nam?  Did IFPRI
offer a differentiated product from these alternative suppliers?  This chapter attempts to
address some of these questions. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR VALUING POLICY RESEARCH, INFORMATION,
AND ADVICE
Assessments of the returns to biological and physical research, especially directed
at agriculture, have been numerous and well documented.  Alston et al. (1998) recently
reviewed 294 such studies and found that 95 percent of the estimated rates of return were
in the range of 0.4 to 1,480 percent.  The average return was 58.6 percent.  While there
are many methodological and empirical challenges associated with these types of studies,
economists and their agricultural science colleagues have been able to contend with most
of them.  Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) have effectively addressed these issues,
although in a recent seminal paper, Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) question whether
rates of return estimates from econometric studies like those mentioned above may have
been consistently overestimated because of an inappropriate specification of the research
lags.  They argue that the typical arbitrary restrictions on the length and shape of the R&D
lags generate high returns, and they imply that the stock of scientific knowledge
depreciates to zero in time and that this is not what we observe.  They maintain that free-
form dynamic and flexible lag structures are the more appropriate specifications. 
Applying this type of specification on the data set for aggregate U.S. agriculture, they find
that the conventional specification is rejected in favor of a more flexible, dynamic
alternative model in which the productivity effect lasts much longer than previous studies. 
This leads to a rate of return of less than 10 percent, compared to near 50 percent with
traditional approaches. 
Another way of interpreting the Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) arguments is
that benefit-cost studies of research investments underestimate the costs that have been
incurred previously in generating the body of scientific knowledge upon which
researchers draw in undertaking the incremental research endeavor.  But if the research
costs in generating such knowledge are already sunk, then it would seem appropriate to
evaluate  investments at the margin without taking account of historical investments,
especially when the purpose is to assess the contemporary worth of an individual
institution's research portfolio.  Indeed, it is not clear if Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998)
imply that their criticisms of rates of return studies are only limited to those employing
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econometric techniques to aggregate time series or cross section data, or whether they
also apply to those that examine particular applied research investments or projects, as in
this study.  It would appear that they are not able to differentiate adequately between
research investments at the more basic end of the research spectrum and those at the
applied/adaptive or near-market end.  However, they do acknowledge (pp. 28-29) that
more applied research may indeed have much shorter lags than more basic research.
These contemporary methodological issues aside, it is a fact that there have been
few studies that have attempted to evaluate the returns to social science or policy
research.  This has been a challenge, not the least because the results are not embodied in
a final product like so much biological or physical research.  Often the products of social
science and policy research come in the form of new data, information, knowledge, and
sometimes wisdom, aimed at influencing human endeavor.  Understanding causes and
effects hence is difficult. 
Lindner (1987) views the information from social science and policy research in a
Bayesian framework.  Information reduces the opportunity costs of wrong decisions,
which amount to uncertainty.  It also reduces the costs of perceived or real risks. 
Increases in information and in its accuracy, reliability or precision, increases its value in
the sense of reducing the expected value of perfect information.  The IFPRI work in Viet
Nam would qualify as detailed, in depth, and comprehensive in the sense that it canvassed
many policy options and subjected the results to a large number of sensitivity analyses to
test the robustness of the conclusions.  Implementation delays with policy research are
likely to be long according to Lindner.  In Viet Nam they were minimal, no doubt due to
the socioeconomic and policy environments described earlier in this paper, but due
significantly to the timeliness of the IFPRI work and its nature. 
Babu and Mthindi (1995) bemoan the fact that decisionmakers often do not use
information in making policy decisions.  Too often decisionmakers are involved in
“firefighting,” with little time for informed decisions.  Paucity of data is also often a
handicap to policy formulation.  In Viet Nam fortunately neither was the case.  Babu and
Mthindi separate the benefits of policy research into pre- and post-decisionmaking
benefits.  The former involve improved processes related to capacity building and
institutional strengthening.  The latter are evaluations of the primary and secondary
impacts of the policies that emerge.  They measure costs and process benefits but do not
attempt to measure impacts.  The “process benefits” from the IFPRI research with Viet
Nam have been described in earlier sections of this paper.  Later we will attempt to
measure the impacts. 
Garrett and Islam (1998) suggest that social science evaluation should only look at
outputs, processes, and  potential outcomes, rather than focusing on actual policy
outcomes.  They maintain it is difficult to establish a direct link to the policy impact of
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social science research and that often the research contributes to a body of knowledge that
policymakers access when and if they see fit.  In the case of Viet Nam, it seems clear that
the environment was already conducive to policy change.  The IFPRI study also had the
four features Garrett and Islam attribute to Weiss (1980) that policymakers find useful: 
(1) research quality, (2) conformity to expectations, (3) action orientation, and (4)
challenge to the status quo.
It is contended here that evaluating the quality of the research output and the
processes by which a research institute carries out and communicates its research findings
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for judging impact.  Garrett and Islam
maintain that it is sufficient.  One must also look at post-decision impacts if an institution
is going to be able to differentiate its product from others and sustain funding support.
Park (1998) proposes a cross-country econometric approach to the measurement
of the benefits of policy-oriented research.  On the assumption that social welfare can be
equated with economic efficiency, he describes a simultaneous equations model where
policy research in a country generates knowledge that improves the quality of policy,
which then impacts on economic growth.  Dollar and Pritchett (1998) provide clear
empirical evidence that sound macroeconomic and trade policies in developing countries
substantially increase economic growth and reduce poverty.
In this author's view, IFPRI can be regarded as an institution that contributes to
the body of international social scientific knowledge through the quality assurance
processes of independent peer review.  This knowledge includes mostly goods of a public
nature at the basic-strategic end of the research spectrum.  Because of the quality of its
staff, it can also draw on the same body of knowledge to build a reputation and credibility
that enables it to respond to requests for collaboration on more applied aspects of social
science and policy formulation in a timely fashion, bringing the best of methodology and
analysis to bear (Figure 2). 
IFPRI's unique role and character is described in the recent study by Christian and
Pardey (1998).  Their bibliometric analysis compares IFPRI's publication output with five
other institutions who also conduct policy research.  IFPRI compares more than favorably
with the others using most measures of contribution to the scholarly literature.  They
found that IFPRI effectively conducts both applied and more basic research, provides a
linkage between developed- and developing-country scholarly communities, and
contributes to the more rapid transfer into practice of new policy knowledge because of
its ability to act as an intermediary between scholarly communities and policy clienteles. 
IFPRI's published work is cited to a similar extent to all of its comparators in the study,
and all are cited more often and more widely than are economics papers in general.  The
Stanford Food Research Institute had a significantly higher citation rate, although a lower
scholarly publication record, than IFPRI.
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Clearly, there are alternative suppliers of social science and policy research and
advice such as universities, Winrock International, the Harvard Institute for International
Development, and until recently the Stanford Food Research Institute.  IFPRI has a
critical mass of policy researchers all devoted to the problems of developing countries
and can assemble teams with complementary skills relatively quickly.  IFPRI also has
experience in primary and secondary data gathering and analysis and access to data bases
that gives it some comparative advantage over many other alternative suppliers.  Being in
the CGIAR perhaps provides a primary differentiating factor, compared with these other
internationally recognized entities.  Countries like Viet Nam are quite familiar with other
CGIAR centers like the International Rice Research Institute and the International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics; when it learned that IFPRI is a part of the
same system that serves so well in the biological sciences, its level of confidence rose. 
All of this potentially gave IFPRI the credibility and reputation to reduce the research and
adoption lags associated with its research vis-à-vis alternative suppliers.  In the mind of
this author, this has certainly been evident in the Viet Nam rice policy work, and the
economic value of the time saved hence is one legitimate measure of its impact.6
This type of impact can be measured empirically if the policy research has the
requisite analysis and data to enable it to be done (Figure 3).  This should be true in most
cases, and it certainly is in the study with Viet Nam.  In the first quadrant, the conceptual7
relationship between the duration of the research project and the output of knowledge or
information is shown to exhibit a typical phase of increasing and then decreasing returns. 8
Moving anti-clockwise, the knowledge and information is then shown as affecting the
time it takes to effect a policy change in the second quadrant.  Presumably this
relationship can take many forms. Instead of the reverse L-shape depicted in Figure 3, it
could conceivably be a step-like function, commencing with a vertical phase on the left
and ending with a vertical phase on the right, after a horizontal phase in between.
The saving in time from knowledge and information is then transformed in
quadrant 3 into improvements in economic welfare from the more timely policy changes. 
It is basically the benefits from discounting a stream of income gains that commence
earlier.  When these discounted welfare benefits are mapped in research time space, it
results in the relationship depicted in the fourth quadrant.  If the IFPRI research took OA
time to complete, then the value of this research is measured by AB.  However, if we
assume that alternative suppliers eventually would have come up with policy relevant
research and recommendations, but would do it with the production of less persuasive
information and knowledge, then all of OA cannot be attributed to IFPRI.  If we assume
the research time X discounted benefits relationship of alternative suppliers in quadrant 4
is DC, then one measure of the net impact of IFPRI is given by CB. 9
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Traxler and Byerlee (1992) viewed crop management research as generating
information that changes farmer practices involving the combination of inputs.  The result
is that the logistic curve typical in adoption studies is shifted to the left, increasing both
the rate and the ceiling level of adoption, compared to what it would have been if
alternative suppliers of the information were the only source.  However, they did not
attempt to empirically estimate the benefits of crop management research using this
approach. 
There is always the possibility that the policy changes made will be reversed at
some future time when the political environment changes.  In this event, the benefits can
be short lived.  One commentator has pointed out that although Viet Nam has announced
a commitment to the World Trade Organization and Asian Free Trade Association
agreements on tariff and protection dismantling, it has yet to wholeheartedly and
irrevocably commit to them (Warner, Center for International Economics, personal
communication).  Impact evaluation must be sensitive to the possibility of such reversals. 
Indeed, in 1998, there is some suggestion that the government of Viet Nam is still
unwilling to completely free up rice exports, as it placed a temporary embargo on further
increases in 1998 exports in mid-year.
ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF IFPRI COLLABORATION WITH VIET NAM
During the interview process it was evident that there were many influences on
the decision to relax internal and external controls on trade in rice substantially in
1996–97.  Stakeholders like the ADB and the World Bank were key ingredients, and the
government of Viet Nam had already embarked on a general reform program under the
doi moi.  Indeed, rice export quotas had been increased during the early nineties but not to
the same extent as occurred from 1996.  Many voices were being heard by the
government in 1996 when the decisions were made.  IFPRI's was one of them. 
It will be recalled that many of those interviewed stated clearly that the IFPRI
research hastened the decisionmaking on these issues (Table 7).  The estimates range
from a time saving of at least six months to more than two years (Interviews 4 and 18,
respectively).  Unfortunately, only a few respondents were prepared to provide an
empirical estimate of the time saved, so a distribution and central tendency could not be
derived.  In its place the range was used to set a conservative estimate of one year and a
more optimistic one of two years.  If we apply these time savings to the estimated
increases in national income to Viet Nam from the policy changes that are derived from
the VASEM, we arrive at a measure of the economic benefits from the IFPRI role.  We
will not assume that the economic surpluses generated by a relaxation of controls are all
attributable to IFPRI, rather that they simply occurred earlier than they otherwise would
have.10
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We implicitly assume here that the VASEM simulations correctly portray the
efficiency gains and distributional outcomes from policy changes.  In the Bayesian11
contexts suggested by Lindner (1987) and Gardner (1997), there is of course a cost of
possible wrong decisions due to a chance that parameter values and settings in VASEM
are not the true ones.  In view of the extensive primary data gathering phase and peer
review processes within IFPRI during the many outside seminars and workshops and in
professional journal submissions, the probability of that is minimal.
In Table 8 empirical estimates of the value of the rice policy changes effected by
the government of Viet Nam itself and the IFPRI contributions to rice policy formulation
in Viet Nam are arrayed.  They have been generated using the VASEM model under the
various assumptions about the pace at which export quotas and internal trade flows were
relaxed.  In Row 2A, the benefits of the export quota changes that actually occurred are
calculated as the difference in annual national income between cases 1B and 1A in Table
8.  A conservative view of the impact of IFPRI on these changes is shown in Row 2B as
the difference in national income streams between cases 1B and 1C.  Similarly, a more
optimistic view is in Row 2C, which is derived from the national income differences in
Rows 1B and 1D.  To each of these benefit streams is added the benefit from relaxation
of internal trade restrictions, which are estimated to begin in 1997 in case 1B, 1998 in 1C,
and 1999 in 1D. 
The estimates of IFPRI's contribution to the income gains to Viet Nam generated
from the policy changes peak in 1997.  In the conservative scenario (2B) they cease in the
year 1998, whereas they continue for one more year in the more optimistic scenario (2C). 
The peak value is $54 million in the latter case and $35 million in the former.  The
benefits to Viet Nam from the two policy changes of course continue for as long as the
policies remain in place.  These stabilize at $80 million annually from 1999.  Credit
should be given to the government of Viet Nam for making these policy decisions, which
have clearly had major economic benefits to the country, without adversely affecting the
incidence of poverty.
The present values and benefit-cost ratios of the benefit streams under the three
scenarios are depicted in Table 9.  If we truncate these at 1997 to reflect only those
realized to date, the most conservative estimate of IFPRI's contribution to Viet Nam is a
present value of $45 million, yielding a benefit-cost ratio of 56.  If we use the more
optimistic assessment of IFPRI's role and truncate at 1997, we obtain a present value of
$61 million and a benefit-cost ratio of 77.  Allowing the benefit streams to play out until
2000 does not increase the conservative present value.  For the more optimistic scenario,
the present value increases to $91 million and the benefit-cost ratio to 114 when
calculated to 2000.  The present value of the two policy changes without attribution is12
estimated at $222 million up to 2000, rising to almost a billion dollars if policies remain
in place until 2020.
P w0 ,
P VD
P w1
P w0
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Whereas the interviews in Viet Nam were convincing about the influence of the
IFPRI research outcomes on decisions that had an effect beginning in 1996, the fact that
the research project did not formally end until early 1997 might suggest that attributing
effects in 1996 is heroic.  Although the author believes the scenarios analyzed in Tables 8
and 9 fairly depict the contributions of IFPRI, another set of simulations were done
assuming the policy changes were not affected by IFPRI until 1997.  The present values
and benefit-cost ratios fell between 18 and 23 percent when this adjustment was made.13
The benefits derived from using VASEM in Table 8 exclude those accruing to the
rest of the world from the increased exports of rice from Viet Nam.  Viet Nam is a low-14
cost producer of rice and the rest of the world is a net importer from Viet Nam.  It now
represents some 20 percent of world rice trade, and the current VASEM uses an export
demand elasticity of !12 for Viet Nam rice.  In these circumstances there will always be a
positive net welfare gain to the rest of the world from a relaxation of export quotas on
Vietnamese rice.  Hence the above welfare benefits to Viet Nam underestimate the total
international benefits.  Rice consumers in the rest of the world gain and producers lose. 
The rents of the SOE in Viet Nam are reduced and accrue to both consumers in the rest of
the world and Viet Nam rice producers.  Efficient rice producing and exporting countries
like Thailand may lose from Viet Nam's entry into the world market.
Figure 4 depicts the national and international benefits of a relaxation of rice
export controls in Viet Nam.  The excess demand (ED) and excess supply (ES) curves in
Figure 4b are drawn from the rest of the world market in Figure 4c and the Viet Nam
market in Figure 4a, respectively.  In 1995 the situation was that export quotas of ab in
Viet Nam led to an excess supply curve ES, a world price of a domestic price ofo
 in Viet Nam, and imports by the rest of the world from Viet Nam of ef (=ab). 
With complete abolition of quota controls the world price equilibrates at  (Figure
4b), at the intersection of the new excess supply curve ES and ED.1
The economic rent to the SOE at the original world price  is (A).  This
disappears upon complete relaxation of controls.  One part (ghij) is tr nsferred to the rest
of the world, and the other part (jiba) is transferred to Vietnamese rice producers.  The
net gain in economic surplus to Viet Nam from the removal of restrictions is (B) plus (C)
minus ghij in Figure 4a.  It is these areas that are calculated in Part 2 of Table 8 from the
VASEM model.
Rice producers in the rest of the world lose (D) from Viet Nam's relaxation of
export quotas, and consumers gain (D) plus (E).  The net result is a gain of (E) in
economic surplus to the rest of the world.  Part of (E) is a transfer from Viet Nam SOE
(ghij) and part is deadweight loss elimination.
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Table 9 also shows the present values and benefit-cost ratios with benefits to the
rest of the world included.  Depending on the scenario, inclusion of the international
benefits from the policy changes increases the present values and benefit-cost ratios by 34
to 84 percent.
Viet Nam's share of the total international benefits from the two policy changes is
62 percent.  The balance of 38 percent spills over to the rest of the world.  Between 55
and 61 percent of IFPRI's contribution to the international benefits accrues to Viet Nam. 
It is notable that this implies 39 to 45 percent of IFPRI's contribution to improved welfare
is of an international character in this particular project.  It is perhaps appropriate that this
can be demonstrated for an Institute with an international mandate and a focus on public
good research.
Some 60 percent of Viet Nam's exports of rice are to predominantly low-income
countries of Asia and Africa (Goletti and Minot 1997, 7–27).  These stand to gain directly
from the decline in world prices occasioned by expanded exports from Viet Nam. 
However, the benefits of lower world prices from Viet Nam's expanded role in the export
market also accrue to countries importing rice of similar quality to Viet Nam but from
other countries.  To the extent that these are also low-income countries, the international
benefits from Viet Nam's rice policy changes may have tended to favor the poor also.  In
1992–94 low-income countries represented some 50 percent of total world rice imports
(personal communication, M. Rosegrant using IFPRI IMPACT model).  Hence, even
more affluent countries participated significantly in the welfare gains from Viet Nam's
increased role in the world rice trade.
The VASEM simulations in Tables 8 and 9 can be combined with net benefit
ratios from the household survey data used in the IFPRI research to assess the impact on
poverty in Viet Nam.  Table 10 shows the number of people who move above or below
the poverty line set at the income level equivalent to the 25 percentile in 1995.  This wasth
Dong 710,000 per capita per year (US$66) in 1992–93 terms.
Overall the two policy changes are shown to have marginally increased the
number of people falling below the poverty line.  However, the increase represents less
than 0.1 of the population.  The conservative scenario on IFPRI's role suggests a small
reduction in poverty, while the more optimistic scenario indicates a marginal worsening
of poverty.  The latter result is difficult to rationalize.  Indeed these results differ from
those obtained by Goletti and Minot with earlier versions of VASEM.
The primary conclusion from this poverty analysis is that, in the short term, the
policy interventions by the government of Viet Nam and IFPRI's role in them may have
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had a neutral effect on the numbers in absolute poverty in the short term, or at worst had a
very small adverse effect.  However, there may be long-term benefits to the poor through
the contributions of these policies to economic growth and the now well-documented
effect of this on poverty alleviation (Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire 1990; Deininger and
Squire 1996; Roemer and Gugerty 1997; Dollar and Pritchett 1998).
6.  LESSONS LEARNED
There are a number of issues that emerged during the course of this study that
might be worth raising as IFPRI continues its impact assessment program:
1. One of the effective aspects of this study was the engagement of both professional
peers and policy advisers and decisionmakers from Viet Nam during the planning
and conduct of the research.  This helped ensure that policy research capacities
were strengthened, while allowing the directions of the research to be responsive
to the needs of policymakers.  This increased the probability of adoption of the
recommendations by building a sense of ownership of the outcomes by the
primary collaborating partner, MARD.
2. Communication strategies are critically important.  Both their timing and extent
are influential.  The Steering Committee of partners facilitated interaction and set
the stage for subsequent consensus-building beyond the immediate collaborating
partner.  IFPRI's extensive use of seminars and workshops involving a wide array
of partners and stakeholders as soon as the research outcomes were available
helped build an essential consensus around key decisionmaking events.  In a
diffuse policymaking environment and where there are structural changes
occurring, as was the case in Viet Nam, consensus building is a key strategic
objective.  As others have noted, IFPRI cannot rely solely on professional
publication to have impacts.  These are necessary, but not sufficient.
3. The timing of the research and its timeliness are the most influential determinants
of the adoption of the recommendations that flow from it.  To have results
emerging within one year in such a dynamic policymaking environment as Viet
Nam helped to make the study relevant to contemporary issues.  A downside to
this is the risk of making empirical mistakes in the analysis, which could
materially affect the policy advice.  While this was not evident in this case,
refinements to the model after peer review did alter empirical estimates
significantly, but not in a way that compromised the initial advice.  There needs to
be a balance between timeliness and quality, lest the costs of wrong policy
decisions outweigh the economic value of timely advice.  
4. The training of technicians and policy advisers in the science and art of surveys,
market economics, and economic modeling is especially valuable in transitional or
emerging economies like Viet Nam.  There is an eagerness to learn and build upon
the specific research conducted within the context of the project.  Of course, there
is no substitute for formal academic training at tertiary institutions in developed
market economies and IFPRI obviously should not do this.  However, where there
are young professionals returning from graduate programs in the United States,
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Australia, and elsewhere, as is the case in Viet Nam, opportunities are growing for
even more productive collaboration in future. 
5. There are advantages and disadvantages in having a ministry of a government as
the primary collaborating partner, rather than a research institution.  One
advantage is that there is a greater likelihood of influencing policy responses in
the short term, and this obviously has high economic value.  A possible
disadvantage is that staff of ministries can have a higher turnover than research
institutions and they are often called upon at short notice to address emergent
issues.  This can affect the ability of Ministry staff to maintain and update data
bases and refine models to keep them policy-relevant.  A tripartite collaboration
may be a preferred arrangement in the future to try and minimize these trade-offs.
6. Successful projects like this one with Viet Nam can lead to a derived demand for
continuing input from IFPRI in a country.  Indeed, this is another measure of the
impact of IFPRI's work.  However, a project mode with its limited time horizons
may not be the preferred vehicle to respond to such demands.  Core long-term
support, which allows sustained impact in terms of institutionalization and
capacity building, would seem desirable.  In Viet Nam the view was that it was
the in-depth study of the rice sector that differentiated IFPRI's product from
others, and further collaboration should be of a similar type.  The payoff to
continuing, longer-term involvement by IFPRI in newly emerging economies like
Viet Nam is conceivably much higher in terms of the value of new information to
inform the policy process, than in countries with a much longer tradition of policy
research. 
7. The funding support of stakeholders like the ADB and the World Bank can be an
effective lever to effect policy change in a country.  While some would discourage
such associations, a case can be made in favor of it.  The important point is that
the conduct of IFPRI's research and the conclusions and recommendations that
emerge are seen by the country, and importantly by IFPRI's peers, as not being
compromised by the source of funding.  This requires the IFPRI research team to
focus on building a clear sense of ownership of the research by the partners in the
country and subjecting the research to extensive review by a wide range of peers,
partners and stakeholders alike. 
7.  CONCLUSION
The changes to rice policies effected by the government of Viet Nam from 1996 to
1998 had a large and measurable effect on national income in Viet Nam.  To this extent,
they were a wise and timely set of decisions to which many stakeholders, both national
and international, can take some credit.  The present values of the changes are already
worth some $61 million to Viet Nam and could rise to $966 million if they are sustained
to 2020.  The decisions also generated positive benefits to the rest of the world, which
from 1989 had become a net importer of rice from Viet Nam.  The country now
represents some 20 percent of the world rice trade.  Around 40 percent of the total gains
accrue to the rest of the world and could be worth $560 million by 2020.
The research conducted by IFPRI with Viet Nam during 1995–97 clearly helped
illuminate the policy environment with new information, and not only informed but
influenced the timing of the changes to rice policies that ensued.  The conservative
estimates of the benefit-cost ratios on the investment made in the IFPRI research are 56
when only the benefits to Viet Nam are included and 91 when the returns to the rest of the
world are included as well.  These rise to 114 and 187, respectively, under a more
optimistic scenario.  These benefits are in addition to those that should properly be
credited to other stakeholders who were and are working on economic policy issues in
Viet Nam, which provided a climate for further change.  These include the Harvard
Institute for International Development, the National Centre for Development Studies in
Canberra, and the Centre for International Economics in Canberra, among others.
The policy changes, and IFPRI's contribution to them, not only represented a large
increase in the efficiency of use of resources, but probably were neutral in their short-term
effects on the numbers in absolute poverty, both in Viet Nam and the rest of the world. 
These estimates of the value of the IFPRI contribution do not include the benefits
of training, capacity building, or the influence of the research itself on the type, quality,
and extent of the policy decisions.  In other words, it is assumed the decisions would have
occurred anyway, but much later.  Nor do they include what dynamic efficiency gains
may have been set in train as a result of the static efficiency gains estimated here. 
Freebairn (1997) suggests the former are usually much larger than the latter.  To these
extents it is contended that the total benefits from IFPRI's involvement are probably
larger than measured here.   
The estimation of the benefits from the policy changes in Viet Nam, and of
IFPRI's contribution to them, rely on the same basic model that was used to provide the
advice to Viet Nam in the first place.  As Krugman (1997) and Timmer (1998) point out,
there is hence a circularity about this type of impact assessment.  To avoid this ideally
requires an independent assessment with new post-decision primary data and presumably
a new model.  The ideal will continue to be elusive and in its place the above estimates
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will have to suffice.  It should be noted, however, that the model used in this ex post
assessment in fact had a number of refinements that improve the precision of the
estimates of economic surplus from the model used in the original study.  The new
estimates are much lower than those estimated earlier but would not change the nature of
the policy advice that was given. 
If one of the major benefits of policy research of the type evaluated here is to
hasten the change of policies in welfare-enhancing directions and these impacts erode
over time, does this imply that the optimal strategy for IFPRI is to purposely identify
short-run applied country policy projects rather than longer-run more basic studies that
primarily add to the body of knowledge?  This is not the appropriate inference.  Rather
the  experience in Viet Nam suggests that there may be high value to the cultivation of
long-run relationships with policymakers and professional peers in partner countries.  In
this process there may be scope for a sequential portfolio of policy-relevant research to be
undertaken, such that at any point in time there will be a continuous benefit stream
generated from the “preponement” of many and varied policy decisions.  At the same
time, as this study shows, professional papers can emerge that not only add to the body of
knowledge, but improve the quality of applied policy research and better inform future
decisions. 
The large benefits generated from IFPRI's research with Viet Nam were no doubt
partially due to a receptive policy environment.  There was a momentum of change
toward a more liberalized economy.  To the extent that it is feasible, the experience of
IFPRI in Viet Nam might suggest that, if potential impact is to be a major criterion in
setting country priorities, explicit attention ought to be given to the revealed directions
and speed of recent policy changes in candidate countries. 
Appendix 1
PERSONS INTERVIEWED
VIETNAMESE INSTITUTIONS
Government Price Committee (GPC)
Professor Dr. Ngo Tri Long, Vice Director
Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Bao, Head, International Cooperation Department
Hanoi Agricultural University (HAU)
Mr. Nguyen Trong Dac, Deputy Head, Rural Development Department
Institute of Agricultural Economics (IAE)
Dr. Nguyen Tien Manh, Director
Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Que, Head, Department of Agricultural Enterprises
Mr. Nguyen Cong Chuc, Senior Researcher
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
Mr. Ngo The Dan, Vice Minister
Mr. Cao Duc Phat, Director, Department of Agricultural and Rural
Development Policy
Mr. Dang Kim Son, Deputy Director, Department of Agricultural and
Rural Development Policy
Dr. Huynh Xuan Hoang, Director, Planning and Projection Department
Mr. Nguyen Manh Trung, Senior Officer, Department of Planning and
Projection
Professor Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Kinh, Director, Department of Science,
Technology and Product Quality
Nguyen Viet Hai, Vice Director, Department of Science, Technology, and
Product Quality
Dr. Le The Thin, Senior Economist, National Food Security Committee
Associate Professor Dr. Nguyen Kim Vu, Director, Post-Harvest Institute
Dr. Nguyen Van Bo, Director, National Soil and Fertilizer Research
Institute
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI)
Mr. Ho Quang Minh, Deputy Director General, Foreign Economic
Relations Department
Mr. Ray Mallon, Consultant, Central Institute of Economic Management
(CIEM)
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National Economics University (NEU)
Mr. Vu Kim Dung, Head, Microeconomics Department
Mr. Vu Huy Thong, Vice Head of Department, Faculty of Marketing
National Institute of Agricultural Planning and Projection (NIAPP)
Associate Professor Dr. Vu Nang Dzung, Director
Sub-National Institute of Agricultural Planning and Projection (Sub-NIAPP)
Dr. Nguyen The Binh, Vice Director
Dr. Nguyen Van Nhan, Deputy Director
Viet Nam Agricultural Science Institute (VASI)
Professor Dao The Tuan, former Director
OTHER INSTITUTIONS
Dow Jones, Hanoi
Ms. Anya Schiffrin, Bureau Chief
Food and Agriculture Organization, Hanoi (FAO)
Dr. Marcel J. G. Messier, Representative in Viet Nam
Mr. Vu Ngoc Tien, Programme Assistant
United Nations Development Program, Hanoi (UNDP)
Mr. Nguyen Thanh Tung, Programme Officer
World Bank (WB)
Dr. Alexander F. McCalla, Director, Rural Development
Dr. Geoffrey B. Fox, Manager, Rural Development and Natural Resources
Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region
Dr. Choeng Hoy Chung, Senior Economist, Rural Development and
Natural Resources Sector Unit
Dr. Christopher Gibbs, Principal Rural Development Specialist
National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University (NCDS)
Professor Ronald C. Duncan, Director
Private Consultants
Mr. Tom Slayton, Rice Analyst
Dr. Robert Warner, Centre for International Economics (CIE)
Appendix 2
IMPACT OF IFPRI IN VIET NAM RICE POLICY FORMULATION
QUESTIONS TO PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS
A. Capacity Building/Impact Sustainability
1. Assessment of value of training programs. 
2. What are trainees now doing?  Are they using the skills obtained?
3. How valuable was the study tour to Thailand?
4. Are the data bases still being used?  What for?  Are they being
maintained/updated?
5. Is the government now providing more price and marketing information to
the agents?  Is this on radio and TV?  (Survey found that personal contacts
were the main source of this in the past)
6. Have collaborators used VASEM for other purposes? 
B. Background and Policy Environment
1. Policy on export relaxation began in 1989 and also that on encouragement
to commercial and private internal trade. How did IFPRI's policy options
influence policy formulation from 1995 onward?
2. What was the motivation for the early change to liberalize exports?
Foreign exchange? Declining farmer prices for rice? Alleviation of
poverty? (Note: real prices to farmers declined 1990–95 in spite of the
commencement of export quotas in 1989)
3. Was there in fact an effective export quota in the late 80s and 90s when
exports were allowed—but only up to a maximum?
4. Who do the minister and/or vice minister usually rely on in coming to
decisions?
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C. Influence or Demand for the Research Agenda
1. What was the motivation for choosing or agreeing to IFPRI?  What was
the influence of external stakeholders like ADB, World Bank, etc.?
2. Did the government of Viet Nam have a role in setting the research
agenda?  Was this largely via the Steering Committee or in other ways?
3. What other research beside IFPRI's  was drawn on in making policy
choices? 
4. Was the IFPRI research: (i) relevant,  (ii) timely, (iii) of high quality, (iv)
readable/accessible, (v) and did it have clear policy options, and (vi) other
attributes?
5. What factors led to the continuing derived demand for IFPRI's
collaboration (for example, the diversification and starch studies)?
6. Are there other studies you would like IFPRI to be involved in?
7. In the rice study, were there aspects missing that you would have liked to
have seen addressed?
D. Communicating Results
1. What reports have been read from the IFPRI study?  Has the Final Report
in December 1996 been read?  The Vietnamese translation was available
in March 1997.  Did you read the English or Vietnamese versions? 
2. What did the Committee that was assembled to evaluate the report have to
say about it?
3. What were the most influential/useful/informative communication
vehicles  used by the project: (i) seminars, (ii) papers, (iii) audio-visuals,
(iv) workshops, (v) publications (refereed), (vi) individual interactions,
and (vii) other?
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E. Policymaking Impact
1. Has anything been done regarding credit constraints for millers and traders
as identified in the IFPRI study?
2. How did IFPRI influence the timing of the rice  policy changes?  Did the
IFPRI work speed up the increase in export quotas?
3. Did MARD use the CH-9 conclusions about the effects of the real
exchange rate and monetary policy/domestic inflation on rice
competitiveness in the Cabinet to change policies? 
4. Did the IFPRI analysis in CH-11 of the adequacy of rice production to
ensure food security (1,410 kilo-calories per caput) influence
MOT/MARD to increase exports?
5. Did CH-11 analysis, which showed who would gain and lose from price
changes consequent upon export and other policy changes, have an
influence on policy changes chosen?
6. Was the government comfortable with using nonrice targeted programs for
the poor who were vulnerable to adverse effects from rice price increases
resulting from relaxations to the rice export policies (for example, food for
work, fair price shops)?
7. Does the government plan to fully liberalize rice exports?  If so when? 
8. What were the main issues discussed by the vice minister during his visit
to IFPRI in Washington, D.C. in October 1997?
9. Has the government explored or discussed the issue of use of an export tax
instead of export quotas?  If so, did the IFPRI study assist in the process? 
If not, why not?
10. Has the government considered auctioning export permits to generate
revenue? 
11. Have the options of investing in better transport and/or eliminating
internal trade restrictions been considered?  Did IFPRI's study influence
these decisions?  Has there  been a decision to favor one or the other?
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12. Was IFPRI's work on what export policies would give greater domestic
price stability influential (for example, fixed export quota, export tax,
variable levy)?
13. Were policymakers convinced that quota liberalization would favor the
poor on balance, despite only a third of the households in Viet Nam being
net sellers of rice and hence standing to benefit from price increases
resulting from relaxation of rice export quotas?  (IFPRI's study found that,
in spite of this, the overall incidence and depth of poverty would fall)
14. Have any new institutions been created to give effect to the new policies
(such as price monitoring)?
15. Did the existence of the IFPRI study and staff facilitate the interactions
MARD had with MOT and MOF on the issue of macroeconomic policies
like credit, exchange rates, and monetary policy and the rice sector? 
16. What was the background to the invitation to IFPRI to be involved in the
diversification and starch studies? 
F. New Information and Insights
1. How much did partners learn about the structure and performance of the
rice system from the IFPRI study?  What findings or information were a
surprise to them (for example, the extent of private trader buying of paddy
[96.5 percent] versus the SOE's [2 percent)]?
2. Were partners aware that SOE's costs of marketing were about five times
that of the private sector?  Did this influence subsequent policy
deliberations?
3. Was the analysis in CH-9 on the influence of the real exchange rate and
current account balances on the competitiveness of rice helpful to MARD
in dialogues with other ministries on rice policy changes? 
4. Were partners aware that post-harvest losses were 13–16 percent?  Has
this knowledge led to decisions to upgrade drying, storage, milling, and
grading technology?  (IFPRI recommends encouraging the private sector
in these areas.)
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G. Overview
There are some 13 recommendations from the original IFPRI study.  What was the
reaction of the government to them?
(1) Progressively increase rice export quotas until they are not binding.
(2) Substitute current quotas with export taxes.
(3) Give private sector access to rice exporting.
(4) Dismantle internal policy restrictions on rice movements freely allow
internal trade.
(5) Promote rice exports with measures to improve rice quality, reduce
shipping costs, and improve Viet Nam's reputation among foreign buyers.
(6) Provide access to credit to marketing agents to facilitate procurement
operations, storage activities, and investments in processing and transport.
(7) Provide access to information on prices, food production, international
markets, and the marketing system to a variety of marketing agents, both
public and private.
(8) Encourage a stable and credible policy environment.
(9) Monitor macroeconomic policies to ensure exchange rate depreciation
does not penalize farmers.
(10) Target food security stocks and distribution to food insecure households.
(11) Target investment in agricultural research to increasing yields.
(12) Also target research to improving rice quality.
(13) Invest in post-harvest technology. 
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1. The Net Benefit Ratio measures the value of net rice sales as a percentage of
income and indicates the short-term effect of a change in rice prices on income. 
2. This assumption was later relaxed and the results had no material effect on the
general conclusions arising from the study (see Minot and Goletti 1998).
3. The order in Appendix 1 bears no relation to the interview numbers cited in the
text.  These have been randomly assigned to preserve confidentiality. 
4. Item 17 of Table 7 shows that institutionalization was regarded as the weakest
feature of the project from respondents.  This is of concern from the point of view
of the sustainability of the work. 
5. Gardner (1997, 21) points out that estimates of deadweight losses from U.S. farm
programs by economists were not as influential as advocacy by them to newspaper
editorialists, government experts, and commodity grant representatives, to the
effect that commodity programs were costing billions to taxpayers, but
accomplishing much less for farmers.
6. In the submission to the ADB (IFPRI and DAI 1995) it was stated that IFPRI is a
nonprofit organization and hence it aims to have impact beyond the life of a given
contract.  It can supplement contract work from core in order to ensure impact. It
also leaves “...trails of knowledge in a form accessible to policymakers in
subsequent policy changes” (p.2).  It further stated that it had multiple expertise
that can backstop a particular project at low cost.  It can also draw on many other
country studies and experiences.  This seems to make a strong case that IFPRI is in
the game of generating both spatial and temporal spillovers; that it is somewhat
unique and clearly producing public goods as a result. 
7. Smith (1998) alludes to the challenges in measuring welfare impacts of social
science research using models and cautions about the difficulties of attribution and
the possibility of other rationales for the policy changes.  Chapter 4 addresses the
latter and in the following pages the former is addressed using the VASEM model.
8. It might be argued that Viet Nam is further away from a state of perfect information
in the Lindner (1987) sense than perhaps a country like Bangladesh, where a lot of
previous research on agricultural policy has been conducted by the many national
policy research institutions and by IFPRI.  Hence, Viet Nam's research time x
knowledge/information production function in quadrant A presumably is in a phase
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of increasing returns, whereas in Bangladesh it may well be at the decreasing
returns phase. Such assessments could assist in setting country research priorities in
future. 
9. Of course, the curves in all other quadrants for alternative suppliers in Figure 3
would be closer to the origin also, but are not drawn here so as to keep the graphic
simple.  In this formulation, the inherent assumption is that alternative suppliers
would generate the same quality of information and advice, given sufficient time. 
It may well be this is not the case and IFPRI will always generate higher quality
outputs and in less time.
10. See footnote 9.
11. The VASEM has been modified since the initial simulations reported in IFPRI
(1996).  The version used here is basically that in Minot and Goletti (1998).  It does
not include a multiplier effect from income changes, it uses a domestic rice demand
elasticity of !0.3 instead of !1.0, and it has the export demand elasticity for
Vietnamese rice at !12.0 instead of infinity.  The benefits of policy changes using
the earlier specification were more than double those reported here.
12. From 1975 to 1995 donors had contributed a total of $108 million to IFPRI.  Hence
this single project, representing less than 1 percent of the total cost of IFPRI, has
generated benefits of between 42 and 84 percent of the total costs of all of IFPRI's
programs since it began operation.
13. The 1995–1997 truncation yields the same estimates for all scenarios so only the
1995–2000 series is used for the comparison.
14. I am grateful to Shenggen Fan for raising this issue and to Nick Minot for helpful
discussions and assistance in estimating these international benefits.
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Table 1—Seminars and workshops
Methodology Policy Seminars in Seminars
workshops workshops Viet Nam elsewhere Total
Number of events   2     1   10     6   19
Number of participants 44 100 331 185 660
Table 2—Proportions of households growing and selling rice in Viet Nam
Growing Selling
(percent)
Viet Nam 69.9 35.3
Rural
Poorest 20 percent 91.2 45.7
Richest 20 percent 69.5 39.1
Urban
Poorest 20 percent 31.6 13.3
Richest 20 percent   5.2   3.0
Source:  IFPRI 1996, 382.
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Table 3—The household rice economies of Viet Nam
Income per Proportion of Percentage of Percentage Net Benefit Rice
Capita Households Income of Income Ratio Consumption
Sales as Purchases as Household
b
(1,000 (percent) (percent) (kilograms)
vnd/year)
Viet Nam 1,280 100 13 11 2 768
Rural 1,079 80 16 10 6 806a
Red River Delta 964 20 18 6 12 750
North Central Coast 840 12 11 11 0 724
Mekong River Delta 1,294 17 30 12 19 918
Urban 2,108 20 1 15 -14 617
North Central Coast 1,102 1 3 17 -14 659
Rural
Poorest 20 percent 479 19 16 11 5 780
Richest 20 percent 2,370 11 15 6 9 705
Urban
Poorest 20 percent 566 1 4 33 -29 727
Richest 20 percent 3,233 9 1 9 -8 526
Source:  IFPRI 1996, 384-395.
 The North Central Coast is the poorest region and the two deltas are the most affluent.a
 This measures the short-term effect of a 100 percent change in rice prices on the percentage change inb
household income.
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Table 4—Distributional effects of removal of rice quota  
Proportion of population Change in income
(percent)
Viet Nam 100 4.9    (3.0)
Urban
Poor 3 !0.4    (!2.9)
Nonpoor 17 1.6    (!1.7)
Rural
Poor 37 5.5    (3.9)
Nonpoor 43 6.1    (4.2)
Source:   IFPRI 1996, 395, 425-426.
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are derived from later simulations where the small country exporter
assumption was relaxed (see Minot and Goletti 1998).
Table 5—Rice production, trade, and market trends in Viet Nam
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Paddy production (metric tons) 19.0 19.2 19.6 21.6 22.8 23.5 25.0 26.3 27.6 28.3a
Actual export quota (metric tons) 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.9 3.6 4.0  a
Rice exports (metric tons) 1.4 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.6 4.0a d
Domestic wholesale rice (Mekong
River Delta) prices (US$/ton
nominal) 143 135 162 155 159 163 200 207 201 195b
Domestic real paddy prices
(dong/kilogram) 480 600 490 370 330 320 370 400 … …b
(US$/ton) 107 87 53 33 29 29 34 36 … …
Viet Nam rice export price 194 170 226 207 203 218 266 285 247 260
(US$/ton)c
Sources:
 IFPRI, 1996, p. 238, and personal communication with Francesco Goletti.a
 Goletti and Minot, 1997,  pp. 5-33.b
 Viet Nam prices rose from 65 percent of Bangkok <5 percent brokens in 1989 to 79 percent in 1996.c
 Exports to May 1998 were 2.5 million tons, which is in excess of what was planned to meet the quota.  Exports for all of 1998 are expected tod
be no more than 3.8 million tons.  Originally the quota was set at 4.0 million tons, but in mid-1998 the government revised this down to 3.6
million tons due to concerns about drought and food security. 
Assessing the Impact Rice Policy Changes
In Vietnam and the Distribution of Policy Research
James G. Ryan February 1999
Impact Assessment Discussion Paper No. 8 Page 53
Table 6—Chronology of rice policy decisions by the government of Viet Nam (GOV) and
               IFPRI involvement
Year IFPRI activities Government decisions
1992 Initial contact with VASI director in France. Ri  exports at 1.9 million tons.
Suggestion for IFPRI to undertake research
collaboration.  Planning for IFPRI senior
staff visit to Viet Nam.
1993 Director of Markets and Structural StudiesLand Reform Resolution No. 5 (five rights)
Division visits Viet Nam.  Establishes promulgated.
formal linkages with government. 
Recommends visit of director general.Rice exports at 1.6 million tons.
1994 Director general leads IFPRI delegation toGovernment response to IFPRI visit passive.
Viet Nam.  Introduces IFPRI’s program to
ministries and research organizations. Rice exports at 1.9 million tons.
Explores scope for collaboration.
1995 IFPRI commences study on property rightsRice exports at 2.0 million tons.
to land with VASI as part of multicountry
study.  IFPRI/DAI submit proposal on RiceHigh world prices of rice.  Rice trade very active. 
Market Monitoring and Policy Options Government imposes controls on domestic trade
Study to ADB in May after invitation tofrom concern about food security in north. 
make submission, a competitive process. Illegal rice flows to China.
Funding approved in July and project
commences September.  Surveys begin
December.
(continued)
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Table 6—Continued
Year IFPRI activities Government decisions
1996 Surveys continue to June; training coursesIntense discussions in many government fora
conducted January-March; study tour tostimulated by the IFPRI studies led to
Thailand undertaken in June.  Analyticalreevaluation of rice policies.
work undertaken July-September.  Final
workshop in October to present results. Crisis in May-June after main April harvest led
Many seminars around country before andto significant price falls.  Farmers complain to
after. provincial leaders in south.  Minister of
Agriculture and Rural Development visits south
to review situation and promises farmers price
support.  Intense discussions in December
involving MARD, Government Office, SOE,
MOT, MPI, MOF, Government Price
Committee, provincial leaders over rice price
policy and exports.  MARD main protagonist for
liberalization using IFPRI study as a key input.
Exports reach 2.9 million tons without a crisis.
1997 Training program on VASEM model Decrees by Prime Minister in March raise rice
January and March.  Conclusions of ricexport quota to 3.5 million tons, allow
policy study presented at World Bank/FAOcompetition between SOE and provincial food
Seminar on Rural Development in Hanoi. companies, and liberalize domestic trade.
Model refinements in response to feedback
do not alter conclusions. Rice exports 3.5 million tons.
IFPRI joins Lincoln International in June toMarket monitoring unit set up in MARD in
bid on United Nations Development November. 
Programme (UNDP) rural development
strategy contract.  IFPRI responsible for
agricultural diversification and poverty
mapping.  Project commences August.
MARD delegation led by Vice Minister
visits IFPRI in Washington, D.C.
(continued)
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Table 6—Continued
Year IFPRI activities Government decisions
1998 New study on starch industry developmentN w decree by Prime Minister raising rice export
with PTRI and Centro Internacional dequota to 4.0 million tons and providing for
Agricultura Tropical funded by the private-sector participation.
International Development Research Centre.
UNDP project on diversification and povertyexport licenses.  No licenses yet issued.
mapping completed and seminar held in
March Government curbs further exports in June after
Decision to have IFPRI Board of Trusteestons.  Domestic prices very high.
meeting in Hanoi in February 1999 and to
hold symposium on Food Policy in Rice exports still expected to reach 3.8 million
Indochina jointly with MARD. tons.
Food processing study conducted in April
for the United Nations Industrial
Development Organisation involving rice,
coffee, seafood, fruits, and vegetables.
Trade incentives and constraints study
conducted for World Bank in May. 
Impact study conducted July-September.
In March, four private companies apply for
they exceed expected rate in May at 2.5 million
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Table 7—Summary of partner and stakeholder interview responses
Question or issue related to IFPRI study Positive Negative
Number of responses
1. Did aspects of study surprise or give
original insights? 17 2
2. Policies on rice export quotas and increased
private-sector role influenced 16 1
3. Policies on rice export quotas and
relaxation of internal trade controls
occurred earlier than otherwise 14 0
4. Training was effective 10 0
5. Overall assessment of study excellent 9 1
6. Data and recommendations used by
government of Viet Nam 8 0
7. Conclusions on links between rice export
quotas and poverty/food security influential 8 1
8. Expressed demand for further IFPRI policy
research 5 0
9. Policy on rice export tax influenced 5 1
10. Policy research capacity sustainably
strengthened 5 2
11. Policies on targeted programs for poor
influenced 4 0
12. Conclusions on importance of exchange
rate and monetary policies on rice
competitiveness influential 4 1
13. Policy on credit availability influenced 4 2
14. Data and recommendations used by
stakeholders 2 0
15. Is VASEM model still being used? 2 4
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Table 7—Continued
Question or issue related to IFPRI study Positive Negative
Number of responses
16. Press coverage good 1 0
17. Institutionalization good 1 4
18. Conclusions on effects of rice export quotas
on domestic price stability influential 0 1
Table 8—Value to Viet Nam of IFPRI research on rice policies
Years
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Export quotas (million tons)
A. Without policy change 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5a
B. At actual levels with IFPRI 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
C. At delayed levels conservative about
IFPRI comparative advantage over
alternative supplies 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.0
D. At delayed levels more optimistic about
IFPRI comparative advantage over
alternative suppliers 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.6 3.8 4.0
2. Benefits and costs (US$ millions)b
A. Benefits of policy changes 0 16 54 60 66 80 80c
B. Conservative value of IFPRI role 0 16 35 0 0 0 0d .e
C. More optimistic value of IFPRI
role 0 16 54 36 0 0 0f
D. Cost of IFPRI research 0.183 0.552 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note:
 The de jure quota was set at 2.0 million tons; however, informal exports to China were estimated at 0.5 million tons in 1995.  Hence, the basea
case was set at 2.5 million tons and amounts to an even more conservative estimate of the benefits.
 The benefits include those from relaxing both export quotas and intern l trade controls on rice.  The latter occurred in 1997 in case 1A.  It isb
lagged one and two years in 1C and 1D, respectively.  Only benefits accruing to Viet Nam are shown; those to the rest of the world are
excluded here.
 Measured as the difference between national income estimates generated from VASEM under 1B minus 1A.c
 Measured as the difference between national income estimates generated from VASEM under 1B minus 1C.d
 As actual exports under scenario 1B approach 4.0 million tons, the differences in national income estimates between scenarios 1B, on the onee
hand, and 1C and 1D, on the other, disappear.  This is because under the large country assumption, as Viet Nam approaches the free-market
level of exports, the gains from liberalization are offset by the losses due to lower world prices.  The benefits of export liberalization are
underestimated (overestimated) to the extent that the assumed elasticity of export demand (!12) is t o small (large) in absolute value.
 Measured as the difference between national income estimates generated from VASEM under 1B minus 1D.f
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Table 9—Benefits and costs of the IFPRI research on rice policies to Viet Nam and the rest of the
world
          1995–1997                    1995–2000          
Viet Nam Viet Nam, Viet Nam
only plus ROW only
Viet Nam,
plus ROW
Present values (US$ millions) a
Of policy changes 61 98 222 (966) 355 (1526)b b
Conservative value of IFPRI role 45 72 45 82
More optimistic value of IFPRI role 61 82 91 149
Benefit-cost ratios
Conservative value of IFPRI role 56 91 56 103
More optimistic value of IFPRI role 77 103 114 187
Note:
 In 1995, using a 5 percent discount rate.a
 Figures in parentheses represent the present values with the benefit streams from policy changes continued up to 2020.b
ROW = rest of the world.
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Table 10—Effect of policy changes on numbers moving above or below poverty line in Viet Nama
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
(thousands)
Overall effect of policy changes 0 +46 +77 +63 +81 +66
Conservative estimate of IFPRI role 0 +46 -77 -24 -16     0
More optimistic estimate of IFPRI role 0 +46 +77 +134 0 +107
Notes:  A positive figure implies an increase in the number of people who fell below the fixeda
poverty line at the 25 percentile set in 1995.  A negative figure implies a reduction in theth
number of people falling below the poverty line.
Figure 1—Decision processes in rice policy changes in Vietnam
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Figure 2—The place of IFPRI in the social science and policy environments
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Figure 3—Measuring the impact of IFPRI research on rice policies in Vietnam
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Figure 4—National and international benefits from removal of rice export quotas
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